TO BE YOUNG MILITANT NATIONALISTE
AZÉRI IN IRAN

Gilles RIAUX

Résumé : This article analyzes the nationalistic engagement of the young Azérises of Iran through three complementary angles. First, an approach in term of mobilization spaces explains how the future militants reach à a speech of opposition à the Moslem regime. Then, the analysis moves toward the logics of the militant engagement, that it is in term of determinants or payments. To come out of an approach macrosociologique and to be interested à the lived experience permit to put in evidence the importance of the measurements emotional and identitaire. Finally, the cognitive dimension of the engagement is studied while questioning the concepts of habitus and joint of the universes of sense. So appear to the contours of one youth Iranian polysémique that has joint of the preoccupations and difficulties, but expresses them in a differential manner.

It is always delicate to raise youth in autonomous social category. In Iran, she/it appears like one actors keys of all big socio-political evolutions that this country knew since close to thirty years. This category affirmed itself with the Islamic Revolution of which a part of youth townswoman claimed the fatherhood. Thereafter, the new revolutionary État drew abundantly in youth, while mobilizing it under a Moslem shape, to sit his/her/its authority. The generations that didn't know the Revolution form a more homogeneous social category than the one that reversed the Shah's regime and is enrolled itself in the Moslem organizations. This numerous youth post - revolutionary has joint a certain number of preoccupations linked à the modernization and à the tentative of islamisation of the Iranian society. Majoritairement urbanized and educated, she feels with acuteness the securities of the islamisation because she touches the domains that are especially sensitive to him (the fashion, the reports between the sexes or the
leisures). Hostile with regard to the regime, she/it politicized herself/itself by
the negative while rejecting everything that had made yank the previous
generation, that it is Islamism, the revolution, anti-imperialism or leftism
massively. This politicization by the negative doesn't mean that youth
doesn't constitute a stake in Iran of today. À the opposite, she/it is the
recurrent proceedings topic concerning his/her/its place in the Iranian
society. In a country where the political majority gets itself since the age of
fifteen years and where the precedent President of Republic, Mohammad
Khatami, was elected with the massive new generation support, youth
evidently constitutes a major political stake. While tempting to attract
his/her/its voices, the main candidates à the presidential elections of 2005
understood it very well. One cannot say that success was à the appointment
as the shows the scattering of the suffrages between the different candidates
à the first tour of voting. These reveal the difficulties of the class politicizes
à to seize the new stakes put by the post-revolutionaries generations, that
some calls populists are not sufficient à anymore to mobilize.

A data à to take in account, as the notices Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut, is « la
tension between the traditionalism and modernism [that] mark more than
ever the society Iranian post-révolutionnaire » ; this tension is transverse
and also touch the youth that is not, as none could believe it, uniformly
modern and turned toward a struggle of every instant for the liberty. But the
Iranian youth cannot be described only in a dark ultra manner, in
impenetrable torment prey à and only getting involved in practices of
déssubjectivation. The analysis of the militancy of the young Azéris within
the national movement permits to come sometimes out of a conception
hardening of the Iranian youth. She/it is not that this univocal social actor,
consmériste and greedy of liberty, to which one opposes the Moslem youth,
that would be only a revolutionary time hang-over. In this article, we will
take the post-Moslem youth notion that insists on the rupture between the
generations having known the Revolution of 1979, and those born after. This
notion is à to understand like an ideal-type, usable to describe an actor with
his/her/its representations and his/her/its social practices. While making vary
his/her/its degree of opening, we will succeed à in showing that a part of the
young nationalistic militants only corresponds partially à the ideal-type of
the post-Moslem youth. Not possessing the same representations and
convenient social that this last, these young nationalists turn toward another
shape of militancy, more radical in his/her/its speech.

The Azéris of Iran form the main ethnic minority of Iran but it is
difficult to value their nombre precisely; the most serious evaluations
oscillate between a fifth and a third party of the population, either about 20
megas people. Their religion is the Shiite islam, confession that they share
with the Persians whereas the other Iranian ethnic minorities are mainly Sunnite. Their religion and their good economic integration invalidated their desires autonomists a long time. But, at the end of the years 1980, appears to the first national affirmation draft led by a part of the intelligentsia turcophone that got involved in an all-round exploration of his/her/its identity. The nationalistic mobilization possesses a fan of demands that goes from the recognition of the cultural rights for the Azérises à the independence of the Iranian Azerbaijan for the most radical mobilizations. This national movement of Azerbaijan in Iran must not be considered like a simple manipulation come of the stranger, nor to be swept of a reverse of the hand, à the only motive that the Azérises are very well built-in à the Iranian society and would not have any interest à a mindless adventure irré dentiste. Indeed, his/her/its recruiting capacity, mainly within the young generations that find at a time in the nationalistic speech a valorizing identity carrier of future and rooting in the past, demonstrate that the nationalism azéri answers à of the waitings or à of the lacks lived in the Iranian society. Greatly politicized, the young begin and militate within a complex and moving galaxy of groups and small groups that, all, ask for themselves of the national movement. Has shortcoming this variety of shapes of militancy draw themselves the contours of one youth polysémique that shares the preoccupations and the similar difficulties, but expresses them in a differential manner.

This survey aims à to understand the engagement on a nationalistic method of the young Azérises through three complementary angles. In the first place, an approach in term of mobilization spaces will try to show where, when and how could meet the nationalistic intelligentsia and the young militants azérís. In a second time, the analysis will move toward the logics of the militant engagement, that it is in term of determinants or payments. To come out of an approach macrosociologique and to be interested à the experience lived of the militants permit to put in evidence the importance of the measurements emotional and identitaire. Finally, the cognitive dimension of the engagement will be studied while questioning the concept of habitus. To become militant, the individuals must articulate contradictory sense universes with those of their origin middle. This joint that passes by biographic reconstructions is only possible through the intermediary of faces of ambivalence or by a process of réflexivité of the Self.

The spaces of mobilization

In his/her/its interpretative diagram of the national affirmation process, historian Miroslav Hroch isolates three times. Finished once, the work of
revision cultural of the intellectuals, the political agitation is impulsée by an active minority of patriots that wants to spill the idea of adherence à a same national community within the popular layers. When these last integrated the idea to belong à a nation, they get in movement so that the independence becomes a reality. This model that demonstrated his/her/its historic relevance misleads a conception téléologique of nationalism. Perilous for the politiste, this model is felt intimately by the nationalistic azéris that it was about the intellectuals or the active minority of patriots, that be - à to say the militants. Sociologically, these last come mainly from the post - Moslem youth that can recognize itself easily in the nationalistic speech. An adequacy exists between the political identity proposed by the nationalistic intelligentsia and the one sought-after by youth post - Moslem azéri. This adequacy makes possible the engagement provided that the potential militants entered in contact with a nationalistic speech in a recruiting space.

Youth post - Moslem azéri

First of all, the Islamic Republic pursued the œuvre of centralization and modernization of the Pahlavi dynasty permitting a progressive integration of the regions and ethnic groups peripheral à the Persian center. The Azérises benefitted extensively from this and their standard socio - demographic came closer of those of the Persians to become nearly identical. Thus, in today's Iran, the young that they are Persian, azéri or Kurdish share the same preoccupations and the same difficulties. The new generations don't meet by no means in the valeurs promues by the Islamic Republic and have perspectives of social integration limited.

The Iranian society leaves upset of an accelerated demographic transition, marked by a brutal decrease of the fertility during the years 1980, which puts back deeply in reason the family's traditional model. The progress in the communication mediums and the peripheral region integration generalized this new behaviors à the set of the country. The generations been born during this transition tie new reports with their family's members, founded on the mutual respect and the dialogue, and integrated new valeurs. The new shapes of socialization within the family, with the clean receding of the patriarchy, are in total shift with the valeurs promues by the Islamic Republic. They explain the dismissal of the Iranian regime and the apparition of a culture political own à the post - Moslem youth that asks for the change; she/it appeared vigorously at the time of the election of Khatami à the presidential of 1997.

The diffusion of a mass education in Persian language benefitted à the Azérises of which only 11.8 % don't master the official language. This
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constituted population mainly of aged people is in constant reduction. In addition, the young Azéris invested the universities massively. In 2002, 28.2% of the Azéris aged of 15 à 29 years pursued superior studies. The rate reaches 31.3% for the women and remain 25.8% for the men. Thanks to this “massification” of the higher education, Iran counts today more than two studying megas. The universities of État could not answer à asks it that is then himself extensively carried on the Islamic free university (Daneshgah-e Azad-e Eslami). This institution of higher education, whose administrators are near of the power, has little by little table setting the set of Iran. The relatively comfortable entry contest and the existence of this university type in the middle cities permitted à of new provincial social layers to undertake superior studies.

Today, all young Azéris master the persan perfectly--most are bilingual and one sees to appear to the first generations that abandon the Turkish language--and they are numerous à to pursue superior studies. They are therefore in social ascension phase in relation to their parents who only had rarely luck to go à the university. They withdraw a high picture of theirselves of it. She/it is reinforced by the hopes placed by parents in their offspring for which they are often ready à all sacrifices. The reverse of the medal is a decrease of the quality of the teaching and a depreciation of the diplomas that don't guarantee an access à anymore a qualified use.

Otherwise, at the time of such a period of fast extension of the education system, the mobilization of the students and high school students are a classic phenomenon. This incontestable progress sociodémographique didn't touch the set of uniformly the society. A part of youth has partially been saved and has been remained more labelled by the traditional structures of the Iranian society.

In spite of this improvement of their social conditions, the young know important difficulties to fit in the Iranian society. Iran endures a chronic underemployment whose main victims are the young. Convinced to represent the future of the Iranian society, impatient to progress in the social ladder, these battalions of youngsters formed à the university see theirselves banished à of the stations little valorizing and of a big precariousness. These disillusionments are reinforced by the big selectivity of the entry à the universities of État and by the advantages offered à the youngsters descended of surroundings promoted by the regime. In addition, the tendencies à the clientélisme and à the nepotism of the Iranian society disgusts the people who don't have luck to be in contact with a network sufficiently structured to reach à an interesting professional situation. In Iran, these dysfunctions of the work market have a very strong impact on the matrimonial market. The cost become prohibitive of the marriage prevents many young to settle in
couple and forces them à to remain at their parents until a belated age. The frustration of this youth, that had luck to make studies but doesn't withdraw any profit of it and meet in a social status without perspective of future, is a tangible reality of the contemporary Iran, à which overexposes themselves them « normes fold back - joie » and controls it of the leisures.

In a society where all social practices are framed by the Islamic norms and where the leisures are limited severely, she/it takes refuge in a space à her, back of the public space. Youth gilt on the occasion of to buy this space of withdrawal, for in to make a real deprived space where it can herself/itself « désislamiser. » The youth descended of less favored surroundings doesn't have the same moyens : it must find the public spaces, relatively protected from the inopportune interventions of the religious police, to be able to unwind. These spaces are often the cultural places, that it is etc. the studying newspapers, of the clubs of poetry, the associations and the cultural centers, In Iran, the bolting of the economic and political spheres during the revolutionary decade dragged an overinvestment of the cultural sphere in which is engulfed itself the post-Moslem youth. In it, she/it has been encouraged extensively and sustained by the parents that don't hesitate à to be going without to finance the activities cultural of their offspring.

The post-Moslem youth doesn't recognize itself in the norms and the valeurs promues by the power. She/it expressed her/its deep dismissal of the Moslem regime while withdrawing into the cultural sphere, relatively saved by the power. His/her/its tentative to enroll in the political sphere by a support massive à the candidate reformer at the time of the presidential elections of 1997 doesn't fill the discounted hopes. The failure of the reformers drives à a bitter disaffection of the youth majority with regard to the politician. Nevertheless, some Azérises are going to find in nationalism a means to pass their disappointment and to prolong their engagement on a more radical method.

The adequacy between the identity proposed by the nationalistic intelligentsia and youth azérie

This generation or, today, these generations that didn't know the Revolution meet in a society where they don't recognize themselves and are not recognized. However, in parallel, in the Iran post-revolutionary appears to a movement nationalistic azéri that appears by an all-round investment of the cultural sphere by the members of the intelligentsia turcophone, exclude circles of the Moslem power. Has the favor of the opening of the Islamic regime, these last get involved in the production of a supposed to nationalistic speech to demonstrate the particularities of the people azéri that
would have all attributes to be an authentic nation. Having known the years of repression that followed the Revolution, they are conscious that an excessive politicization of their speech would entail an immediate repression and remain heedful, while confining itself/themselves as much as possible à the cultural sphere. The national identity proposed by the intellectual elites must act as case à the frustration of the post - Moslem youth, forbidden of social advancement. She/it transcends the difficulties that she/it meets to affirm itself/themselves as azéri there: the ethnic solution invented by the cultural elites constitutes an answer ideal à their frustration. Indeed, she/it is a recent construction, appeared at the end of the years 1980, and that is adapted à the specificities of a society modernized where a part important of the population benefits a good level d'éducation. The call recurrent à the nationalistic production scientificity, the refusal to politicize the religion, the will to insert the national reason in the regional and global transformations or the supposed concomitance between the demands azéri and the democratization of Iran constitute an in conformity with platform the sensitivity and à the valeurs of the post - Moslem youth.

Besides, the national movement by his/her/its reference à one past far, way of gold age where the nation azéri was united and powerful, offer an identity, at a time useful and valorizing. While fantasizing one past that only has few à to see with lived it collective, the intelligentsia finds the opportunity to receive communion with the set of a mythicized collectivity, while being based on a reinvented common history. She/it transforms the community « d'objet of the passive and despised history, in dynamic and active topic, capable to forge his/her/its own destin ». In spite of his/her/its chimerical character, the reference à this « Âge of Or » drags a mobilization multiple identitaire that permits a déprise of the identity promue by the État à the profit of a news, « plus authentique », supposed to offer more dignity à the individual while allowing him to come true fully. The reference à the nation azéri permits to be located in rupture with the Islamic Republic, while affirming itself/themselves in an universe of sense. It is that that underlines Charles Taylor when he/it analyzes the ideal of authenticity of the societies modernes : «sincere Être towards myself means to be faithful à my own originality, and it is what I am the only à power to say and to discover. While making it, I define myself of the same stroke. I achieve a potentiality that is cleanly mine. Such is the foundation of the modern ideal of the authenticity, as well as of the objectives of blossoming of oneself or realization in which one formulates it the more souvent ».

The young generations azéri can recognize themselves comfortably in the speech proposed by the nationalistic intelligentsia. He/it answers à their questionnement identitaire and à misses them of social recognition while
offering them a political project valorizing. However, so that an adherence à a social movement is possible, the identification à the movement is not sufficient. He/it is necessary that a relation–direct mediatized either–has place enters people already committed and the future militants. In the present case, it is necessary that some young azéris learns the existence of the national movement and impregnate themselves of the speech formulated by the nationalistic intelligentsia. However, the Islamic Republic of Iran remains sensitive very on the ethnic questions in which it made to see the stranger's hand early. A recognition of the ethnicité would entail a discount in reason of the monopoly, already fairly attacked, that pretend to detain the Moslem on the political identity of the Iranians. It is why the État limits the diffusion maximally of the nationalistic speech, while restricting the nationalistic à access the médias ; only the written publications are allowed and many nationalistic Internet sites are filtered. Besides, the nationalists meet another problem, the weak literacy in Turkish language. Whereas more than 90 % of the Azéries master the Persian, only a few more of half declares capable to read in language Turkish azérie, their maternal language. In Iran, to read in Turkish language already constitutes an act militant ; he/it is true that the majority of the publications is oriented fairly. Thus, so that a young azéri can enter in contact with the nationalistic speech, it needs a direct access à this one, that be - à to say the spaces where the future militants can meet members of the nationalistic intelligentsia or former militants.

The recruiting spaces

These spaces exist and they are even numerous in Iran. These are not the traditional spaces of socialization, but of the new spaces appeared with the opening of the Islamic regime after the war against Iraq. As we saw it, the post - revolutionaries generations have numerous cultural activities in the setting of their leisures. They frequent the cultural centers, the clubs of poetry or music and other studying associations. However, these are precisely these places that are invested by the members of the nationalistic intelligentsia. This last is composed of poets, musicians and other specialists of the language questions, in summary of the intellectuals. They often have a relatively important income and a supple schedule, giving them the possibility to take part à of the activities devourers of time and rarely salaried. It is necessary to note that the nationalistic intelligentsia cannot invest nearly that the cultural places being in the provinces turcophones. In the cities of the Persian tray where immigrated massively the Azérises, the intellectual azéris is in competition with their other ethnic group fellows and
facing a public majoritairement non turcophone. With their nationalistic speech of defense of the turcité, they don't have any luck to invest such an environment multiethnique where the Persian is in situation of hegemony.

The first space where the future militants meet the members of the intelligentsia is composed of the cultural places that bloomed in the years that followed the war against Iraq. As well the nationalistic intelligentsia that the post - Moslem youth invested these spaces during the first left of years 1990. The best example is probably the one of Mahmuodali Cheregani, responsible of the GAMOH and that some present as the leader of the national movement. Having entered like volunteer into the war against Iraq, he/it benefits from the opening of the universities à the Moslem militants to pursue literary studies. He/it writes his/her/its thesis of doctorate on the influence of the Turkish vocabulary in the Persian language. He/it becomes teacher à the university of Tabriz in the first half of the years 1990, as form themselves the first cohorts of militants. He/it is à the origin of the language teaching and civilization azéries that is held in margin of the university and doesn't benefit from an official recognition. From his/her/its teaching that is politicized itself himself is structured a core of militants that formed the care brought closer from Cheregani quickly. They constituted the basis of the country team for the parliamentary elections of 1996 of the nationalistic leader whose candidacy was invalidated, in spite of his/her/its large success. Outside of the university, these are the clubs of poetry or the associations of music that form space where the future militants discover the nationalistic speech. À the beginning, nationalism is presented solely under his/her/its version of promotion of the culture azérie, then the future militants are a lot more little by little insiders à a speech politics.

A second space where recruits themselves the future militants is formed of the traditional places of politicization of gauche ; it begins as à to function in the first left from years 1990. Many former activists of left, who militated at the time of the Revolution, are reconverted themselves in nationalism at the time of the downfall of the USSR. They found an ideology of substitution there. Thanks to their organizational capacities and forged programmatics during numerous years of engagement, the former activists of left print a coloration particular à a part of the national movement. Labelled by complex reports with the organizations of left and the USSR, these nationalists preserved inherited some reflexes of passes them like a centralized conception and a strategy of vanguard of the political action. They put à profit their long militant experience to enroll new recruits among the young workers. Because of the weak industrialization of the Iranian Azerbaijan, this type of militants is rarer and meet Tabriz à nearly exclusively. These militants are not part of those that has the more benefitted of the distresses
sociodémographiques that Iran knew. Often descended of more traditional surroundings, they didn't have access à the higher education and evolve in environments greatly marked by a patriarchal culture, that it is à the shop or within the militant cell.

The third space is constituted by the associations and groups of students and will serve à to recruit the new generations of militants, from the end of the years 1990. The weakening of the movement studying, following the repression of 1999, reinforce the presence of the nationalistic azéris considerably in the universities, that appear like a believable alternative. The associations have a legal status and are recognized by the Iranian authorities. They often have for objective the diffusion of the culture azérie as the Azerbaycan Gençler Evi (the house of the young of Azerbaijan). The groups of students, à structures it looser, are politicized more overtly. The two types are interconnected extensively thanks to militants who belong à the two. This space functions as well in Iranian Azerbaijan that in the Persian cities. Already founded by studying militants committed, the associations of students recruit among the new incoming à the university. This classic enough recruiting type is made more efficient by the system of contest of entry à the university. This national exam stretches à dispatcher the studying azéris on the set of the territory what moves away them of their near. The groups and associations of Azéris form a means then to integrate in a new environment, while preserving the possibility to continue à to express itself/themselves in his/her/its maternal language.

Of the analysis of the mobilization spaces clear themselves some sociological information on the young nationalistic militant profile azéris. These come majoritairement of that one called the post - Moslem youth: these are urban youngsters, descended of the middle class or that are in social ascension phase thanks to their access à the university. Not feeling integrated in the Iranian society, they find in the speech nationalistic azéri an answer à misses them of social recognition. In margin of the thickest battalions descended of the post - Moslem youth, exist the militants who didn't take advantage as much of the transformations sociodémographiques and remain more labelled by the traditional structures. While making vary the degree of opening of the ideal - type that is the post - Moslem youth, one sees to appear to another nationalistic militant type that gives a coloration more radical à his/her/its engagement.

**The logics of the militant engagement**

To understand the logics of the engagement, it is necessary to come out of a vision macrosociologique that is only interested à meets it enters social
movement entrepreneurs in quest of position of power, the intelligentsia relegated azérie, and a definite social group, one disillusioned youth, exit of the middle classes, that discovers a hope of change in nationalism. This vision provides a global setting, useful to seize the stakes to can put by a social movement, but it doesn't permit to understand why, within a given social group, some militate and others remain inactive, nor to fear the experience lived of the militants. In addition, the authoritative character of the Iranian regime and the nationalistic group semi - toothwort nature prevent to mobilize statistical instruments. To face these difficulties of methodological order, the only recourse is the narration of life of the nationalistic militants. He/it associates of the moments of ethnographic observation and the interviews of militants. However, the biographic narration is not safe because it permits to give a sense à comfortably a succession of évènements analyzed retrospectively. Letting show « la palpitating flesh of the concret », the biographic narration exercises a certain fascination that, by his/her/its obvious intelligibility, limit the capacity of a critical questionnement on his/her/its relevance. Only the confrontation of different militant trajectories permits to fear the determinants of militancy that make of a young azéri an active militant. She/it also permits the analysis of the payments that the militants find in their nationalistic engagement. The militants don't necessarily look for the same thing in their engagement: they discover all one valorizing identity there but according to different modes, the social integration or the subjektivistion. These modes depend on the variation of the degree of opening of our ideal-standard, the post-Islamic youth.
McAdam, in his/her/its analysis of the engagement at the time of the Freedom Summer, puts in evidence three variables that permit to understand why some militate and of others no. An individual sees his/her/its probability militating to increase if it is à people contact already having a militant activity or if his/her/its personal history minimizes the domestic and professional constraints or if it receives the downstream of those of which it feels near affectivement.

The impact of the first variable has already been described above. The members of the post - Moslem youth entered in contact with people having had an activity militant à two distinct periods, that show that the Moslem youth is not composed of a generation but of at least two. À the course of the years 1990, the first post - Moslem generation enters in contact is with the nationalistic intelligentsia in the spaces devoted à the culture, either with the former leftist militants in the shops and the factories. From the years 2000, the second generation between, her, in contact with the first cohort of militants that shows evidence of an intense mobilization in the universities. The university of Tabriz is one of the major centers of the mobilization and, therefore, is supervised very by the regime.

With regard to the second variable, the difficulties that the young meet to enter on the market of work increase the probability to militate. They evidently minimize the professional constraints while generating a strong inactivity at the young and incite the studying à to pursue their academic degree course maximally. But they also reduce the domestic constraints while stopping the young from getting married so much that they don't have a professional situation capable to guarantee them some appropriate incomes. Besides, on a group of militants of Tehran that meets every Friday in the mountains of the north of the capital, the big majority is born in Iranian Azerbaijan and came late Tehran à to study or to find an use. These people didn't pass by the traditional structures of socialization to integrate socially but by the nationalistic militant networks. Thus, the new students tell to have realized their identity azérie while arriving in the capital and to have begun à to militate since this time. Because of the remoteness, the domestic constraints of these young, come late Tehran à, are very weak. In addition, their emotional circle is therefore in full reconstruction and the groups of militants form the solded communities that can palliate the remoteness of the near. Among those come to work Tehran à, numerous are those that already militated in Iranian Azerbaijan. They integrated à another
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group of militants nationalists thanks to which they could weave a new network of sociabilities easily.

According to the third variable, the potential militant must receive the downstream of people of which he feels near affectivement to commit actively. Thanks to their important cultural capital, the members of the nationalistic intelligentsia exercise a strong influence on the young Azéri. They often establish personal relations with young potential militants that, in counterpart, are incited à to commit and à to become active. À the domestic level, parents encourage their children à to be interested à the cultural activities for their personal blossoming and incite them unconsciously à to enter in contact with the nationalistic intelligentsia. These encouragements serve à to engage the process of engagement. They often stop when their child seems attracted too much by the nationalistic rhetoric, but he is already too late because the potential militant already took the decision to commit. But these are the interactions within the groups of friends that provide the main incitement à the engagement. A real exists dynamic of group that has an effect of practice on the decision to commit. The militants often make state of a near friend that incited them à to enter into the national movement. The solidity of these friendship ties often makes that it is a whole group of buddies that decides to commit. One among them was interested à the nationalistic speech and motivated his/her/its friends to commit also.

These variables have for common point the dimension psychoaffective that is essential in the recruitment of the militants. The support of the near, the presence of friends among the militants, constitute major determinants to explain the engagement of an individual in the national movement. This phenomenon observes itself in an especially strong manner than in Iran, control it experienced by the Islamic Republic on the public sphere forced the individuals à to withdraw into the private sphere. However, as Karl - Dieter Opp and Christine Gern showed it in the context of police oppression of Germany of the East, the private sociabilities constitute the main support of the mobilizations. It is especially true than in Iran, the Islamic État was not able to wanted ever either to exercise a controls totalitarian on the society. The Iranians could take refuge in the sphere deprived to protect itself/themselves from the tentative of islamisation led by the revolutionary État. Besides, in Iran, the use of the Turkish language is reserved à mainly the domestic sphere and à the friendly relations. This language creates by herself a gate between that that his/her/its speakers feel as being the spring of the private sphere and the public sphere. However, by their publications in Turkish, the nationalists have their language of the sphere deprived to display it on the public place, certainly circumscribed by the constraints that
the Islamic Republic imposes, taken. They contribute à a private and public space redefinition that functions more by overlap that by opposition.

*The payments of the militantisme*

The set of them militant pulls their engagement within the national movement a feeling of valorization by the projection of their personal identity in a national destiny, that will be necessarily august. But the payments also vary according to the social origins of the militants and the orientations of the group to which they participate. Whereas the young post-Moslem find the means there to integrate socially and shapes of subjectivisation that accentuate their sensation again to be valorized discover to enroll there in a public space in formation, the young, linked more traditional surrounding à.

a) Recognition and integration social for the militants descended of the post-Moslem youth

A better understanding of the mobilizations of the nationalistic azéris requires to think them à the daily, to be interested à the militant practices. The payments susceptible to find a monetary equivalent or the access à of the positions to can being limited very, it is in the social measurements of the recognition and the integration that it is necessary to look for the payments of militancy. This type of militancy is oriented toward the other.

To break with the monotony of the daily life, to imitate his/her/its friends as joining them in their militant activities, to enter into a shape of transgression of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the engagement offers a whole set of payments à these militants who have for common point to valorize them. The militant feels enclosed of a mission of every instant. In it, militancy constitutes a permanent reassurance institution way. He/it projects the individual in a valorizing identity that transcends his/her/its simple personal trajectory to fit on stream in the one of the nation. Has the instar of that that Hunt and Benfords qualified of discussions of identity, in the setting of an ethnological observation of the Texan pacifists, the conversations that the militants hold between them reactivate their feeling permanently to belong à a particular group whose reason is just. It is through these permanent discussions on the reason and the how of their engagement that the militants sketch biographic reconstructions. They take there in inscription a particular moment of their life, a historic or mythical face that would have put them on the path of the people azéri. These discussions are recurrent and can last longtemps ; intermix themselves of it the elements of the past that drove them à to commit, those of the present describing the
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daily difficulties, and those of one future that they see radiant. The militants come out again from it deeply valorized, sure of themselves and the exactness of their engagement. It is through the intermediary of these conversations that himself makes the joint between the me of the topic and the us of the movement. The I feel built-in à a social universe where a role is assigned him, it feels useful and enclosed of a mission. The utility is very presenting in a society where the young adult integration is difficult. Nevertheless, one of the difficulties that the militants meet in this process of joint between the me and him is the one of the double dimension of the us. Indeed, he/it is us supposed to mean the people azéri in his/her/its whole but covers the finally only us of the militants who invest in the national movement. This hiatus, that has not been theorized always, reflect the ambiguousness of a movement that sadden à to widen his/her/its recruitment.

Besides, militancy places the individual in a circle of sociabilities where all share similar preoccupations. The militants always put forward the excellent ambiance that reigns within the groups whose activities are distributed judiciously between work and leisures, distribution well identified by the militants. The time dedicated à the militant work has a duplicate objectif : it aims à a conscientisation oriented outwards toward the group and à the diffusion of the nationalistic speech. À the course of the meetings, these are especially the different aspects of history and the culture national azéries, then the demands and the strategy of the movement as well as the political context that are presented and discussed by the participants. The critique of the Islamic Republic remains relatively absent there and makes itself in hollow. Otherwise, these studying militants are à the origin of a nationalistic, clandestine publication plethora one no, that serve main instrument of propaganda. They also create the Internet sites that constitute, probably, one of the main means of information for the nationalists. They find there the means to test and to put à profit their overhead formation that, anyway, they only have little luck to valorize elsewhere. Thus, the militant work offers the possibility of a social recognition of expertise acquired during their studies. This recognition is certainly limited à the national movement but, in a country where the market of work is difficult of access, it is far from being negligible. The second left from the militant's schedule is devolved à the leisures that make himself in a specific cultural environment, valorizing all discerned element like cleanly azéri. In a society where the access à the leisures are limited for the non favored classes, the groups of militants palliate there while arranging themselves their own leisures. The main activity is the organization, during the weekend or the holidays, of outlays in the mountains. They are of it safe from an inopportune police squad and, besides, the mountains represent a landscape to which the
Azérises are especially sensitive. Besides, folklore often exalts the mountains as the place preferred of the Azérises. These outlays permit as à the young men and à the young women to meet together, what they consider as very important. Thus, every Friday, a group of militants of Tehran, whose strength varies between 30 and 70 people according to the days, assemble in the mountains situated in the northwest of the capital for a picnic. During these some hours passed in the mountain, they read some poems, sing airs or do traditional dances. For the birthday of a member of the group, they meet to offer him a fairly oriented gift, in this case a statuette of Babak, the national hero. This kind of outlays serves as à the diffusion of the nationalistic speech within the group with the distribution of articles or CD at the end of the day. Although these militants especially differentiate the work of the leisures, a deep continuity exists between the two. One recovers the same people there and of the similar discussions that are held in a less formal manner during the leisures. These regular activities occupy a part important of the schedule and make to pass the militants of an idleness boring à a presenting hyperactivity. The groups of militants form a circle of widened sociability where meet of people come of various horizons that share similar preoccupations.

To be militant implies a whole set of activities chronophages and an integration à a network of sociabilities especially interdependent than he/it can be threatened by the state-controlled repression. This statute entails an engagement in relation to others that makes itself from a reconfiguration of the reports à his and à the other. Between militants, the woven ties are sometimes so strong that they become of the new his. To be militant is located in the thematic of « l'être in société », identified by Faribas Adelkhah as one of the shapes of ethics that increasingly characterizes the contemporary Iranian society. She/it consists in an engagement of the individual in relation to others or in the public sphere, from a redefinition of the reports à his/her/its near and other. In the continuity of the discovery of a new joint between the me of the topic and the us of the movement, by their engagement, the militants scramble the border between the private sphere and the public sphere. While spreading that that they consider as the sphere private à groups it of militants, as the shows the constitution of couples within, the individuals emancipate themselves of a socialization nearly founded exclusively on the family. Thus, they displace some practices, that were before of the spring of the private sphere, toward the public sphere. Such a militancy leads to à a permanent renegotiation of the border between the private space and the space public à the profit of this last.

b) Valorization and subjectivity
Certain militant distinguish themselves of the model of payments presented previously, based on a will of integration and recognition social and of affirmation in the public space. These groups develop a strategy oriented toward the group himself and either toward the other. She/it answers à a need of affirmation of the subjectivity, sensible as the aspiration à to be located outside of the contemporary world. As Arnold Gehlen underlined it, the shaking of the institutions duct à an overbid toward the subjectivity. However, these are precisely the individuals feeling this shaking that stretches à to enter into these groups the most intimately. These are the young that have the less benefitted of the progress sociodémographiques. Not having often had luck to pursue superior studies, they are marked more by the shapes of Moslem socialization and the traditional structures of the Iranian society.

The strategy oriented toward the group himself has for effect convenient to concentrate on the core of the organization, without being interested à really the receipt of the nationalistic speech. This strategy corresponds extensively à the one of the vanguard developed by the parties communistes ; it drives à a radical stance. She/it is influenced by the former militants of left reconverted in nationalism and that preserve strategic conceptions inherited of years 1970. They consider the fact to militate in such a group like a project totaling, that implies a devotion total à causes it. He/it means one self-sufficient life style folded on the group and the subordination of all interests personal à fights it of national liberation. Their strategy privileges a clandestine action while refusing the recourse à the violence, what is revealed inoperative enough tactiquement in the Islamic Iran. Being interested à little the diffusion of the nationalistic speech, their index of action is therefore less clothed that the one of the young post - Moslem. Thus, they limit of as much the risks and protect against a possible repression. This pseudo clandestinity proves to be artificial and serves à more to reinforce ties of solidarity between the militants that à to protect itself/themselves from the Moslem regime. She/it gives the impression à them militant to belong à a fighting vanguard, constantly threatened with a terrifying repression. This strategy deeply turned toward the group himself stretches à to place the militant in a « hors-social ». His/her/its engagement appears like a tentative to run away of the daily, to mark his/her/its irreducible subjectivity facing the march of the world. While imposing the specific practices, that are as many signals reinforcing the cohesion and the homogeneity of the collective, the group marks the border separating it of the rest of the society. Some positions of the hands are signs of recognition between militants as for the Bozkurtlars. Certain militant choose, when they commit, an authentically Turkish name in replacement of their name à
Moslem or Persian connotation. It is interesting to note that the borders of the adherence à group it cut up those of the Moslem youth partially. The cult of the martyrs is there a lot more decision that among the other militants and permits to justify the adherence à the fighting vanguard. À the level of the appearance, certain militant run away the beard as if they went à the prayer of Friday of the university of Tehran. They dress in a strict manner while privileging the black color, à the motive that she/it would be the color of predilection of the Azéréises. It is also the color that the hezbollahi especially loves. The adherence à groups it implies a particular behavior in society, a way of honor code put back à the taste of the day. These nationalistic militants make themselves a duty to show evidence of courage in all circumstance, to watch à the protection of the women of their community. As Luisa Passerini described it, the involvement à this type of movement entails a modification of the manner to discern life, on a communal method thanks to the the very strong ties woven between the members of the group. She/it permits to pass a simple individual project while enrolling in a vast horizon. This enrollment gives a sense à the life of the militants, the impression to participate à a big project, the one of the liberation of the nation azérie.

This young Azéréises elaborate a new ethnic identity shape, on social, economic and cultural uneasiness bottom. To seize the national standard facing the Islamic regime is not only the means to rebel against the in place power. It affirm his/her/its own subjectivity, to tempt to tinker a sense by which the individual could assume itself, also. The nationalistic militant networks take the place of the former shapes of framing, the ethncité takes the place occupied by the Moslem utopia. The groups of militants form spaces of socialization where the young can express themselves in new settings where they become liberated from the tutelage of the Moslem institutions, but also of the weights of some traditional surroundings. This new subjectivity is essential for one youth in prey à of the major problems and that is associated à of the shapes of deviance permanently. His/her/its importance appears in the permanent recourse that this militants à have the comparison. She/it finds her/its roots in the nature dissociative of the ethnic conscience. For George Devreux, she/it always constructs herself/itself in opposition à another identity and leads to à a definition antithetic identitaire in relation to the dominant model. It is especially true for the nationalism azéri whose speech seems to focus sometimes on a demonstration of everything that can oppose a Persian and an Azéri. This dimension is essential to understand the processes of subjectivisation and affirmation in relation to the another one that operates among the young militants. À the breast of these nationalistic militants, the comparison à the Persians are a
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recurrent discussion topic. A long time paid in term of inferiority, the turcîté is not felt anymore like such in relation to the persanîté that would exercise a way of monopoly on the culture. This young militants azéris pulls a big pride of a superiority conquered on the Persians. These last would not have any political project, they would be englués in a pathetic defeatism, only finding solutions of exit à their problems, that it is by immigration, the consumption of drug or the suicide. This type of militancy, oriented toward the group, appears then like a manner to face some of the pains that meeting the Iranian youth. The comparative reasoning doesn't stop là ; it also takes place in relation to the nationalistic militants descended of the post - Islamic youth that, certainly, fight for the same objectives but are supposed to take less risks. To hold a radical speech serves à to move away of the other groups of militants that are in a recognition logic and integration social. He/it avoids to enter in competition with the young provided a more cultural big business while locking the militants in the group in. This self-sufficient working permits à the groups of militants radical to transfigure their cultural and social inferiority in a mental superiority.

To be interested à the experience lived of the young militants brings à a finer understanding of the reasons that pushes à to enter into the nationalism azéri. They answer à of the logical psychoaffectives well more that à a material satisfaction research. Their analysis also puts in light the tensions that cross a more composite youth than could let believe it the post - Moslem youth concept. The militants have joint to pass these tensions thanks to their engagement but they don't give the same sense, what brings à to approach the cognitive dimension of militancy, there necessarily.

**The cognitive dimension of militancy**

The groups of militants require every member a strong investment, that can be total for the organizations the more radicales : their daily practices, that it is in the private or public sphere, integrate in a method life forcing, in conformity with the ideal militant. The situations of intense mobilization that the adherence imposes certain à group nationalists displace the border between the private life and the public life and structure all the experience lived of the militant around the struggle. To integrate all valeurs, or even the supposed to norms to frame the daily life of the militants, militancy supposes to question the initial socialization again. For the set of the Iranian youth, this socialization took place within the family and in the institutions purified of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The post - Islamic youth is reputed to have remained permeable à the Moslem socialization while withdrawing into the
private sphere. However, there again, while making vary the degree of opening of our ideal - standard, appears to a part of youth, more labelled by the Moslem socialization. The rupture that the nationalistic engagement supposes doesn’t make itself in the same way depending on whether one belongs à one or à the other of the two youths.

Certainly, it is through the intermediary of an autobiographic construction has posteriori that the set of them militant justifies their engagement. She/it gives a consistency à the personal trajectory that the militant followed. His/her/its life is reread by the prism of the engagement nationaliste ; appear to the signs annunciators that make of the engagement the outcome natural of his/her/its existence then. But these biographic reconstructions operate differently according to the types of militancy. Indeed, the first, oriented toward the other, borrows à the statements of the réflexivité of the Self. The second, oriented toward the group, draws in the faces of ambivalence that act as tie between the universes of sense of the initial socialization and the national movement.

Militancy oriented toward the other and the réflexivité of the Self

The post - Moslem youth took advantage of the demographic transition to tie reports founded on the dialogue and the mutual respect within the family. To face the Moslem socialization tentative, this youth withdrew into the sphere deprived with the support of parents. She/it knew how to develop a schizoid attitude there to adjust à the constraints put by the Islamic Republic. New valeurs and new practices, preparing this youth à the expression of statements of the réflexivité of the Self, on which the militants lean to give the sense à their nationalistic engagement, emerged this socialization.

As Fariba Adelkhah specifies it about an Iranian modernity, «stated leses of the réflexivité of the Self offer the action points, of the references, a vocabulary à to leave of which all one each can define itself, to affirm his/her/its ‘trains otherwise of life ’, to defend his/her/its interests, says to enter in the competition of the vie ». To choose his/her/its style of life constitutes one of the major features of the contemporary modernity, described by Anthony Giddens. In this modernity, the individuals work again their identity permanently from an index in which they can draw the elements that interest them. The ethnic identity constitutes one of his/her/its indexes, certainly the one where they draw the more, but it is not the only one. Has this consideration, the manner of which the students of Ardebil describe the editorial line of their Sayan magazine is revealing. They open their pages à extensively the nationalistic speech but don’t want to limit itself/themselves of it. He/it seems very important to them to open up other
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d'accès à a that must contribute à their personal blossoming and à to open the mind of their readership. Thus, they treat literature Anglo-Saxon--the majority of people that write there are students in Anglo-Saxon literature--or of big proceedings of society, that it is on globalization or post-modernity, for example. This opening allows them to become liberated from a conception that they sometimes judge too reducing of the identity azérie, that would be the only applicable identity. She/it is also the opportunity of proceedings within the newspaper to know if him fallait not rather to concentrate more specifically on the nation azérie, that to disperse itself/themselves on thematic too various.

Still in the perspective of the réflexivité of the Self, it is interesting to note the apparition of a speech on the food, the domestic relations or the physical education according to an orientation azérie. Has shortcoming these works, the reader is supposed to learn and to understand how behaves an Azéri ; he is supposed to integrate a whole set of know-being, but also of ability, own à his/her/its community. This speech functions on a permanent comparison with the Persian culture. Thus, the Turkish food regime is described like healthier because it resorts à many vegetables while the Persian cuisine made a too big use of rice. The champion of weightlifting, Hossein Rezazadeh, is presented as the symbol of a physical education authentically azérie that it is good to imitate. This literature shows us that the Azérises integrate in their daily life a procedure of choice between several possible universes. They are capable to plan their life style by a choice. While committing, these militias get involved in the permanent work of possession describes by Anselm Strauss : « celui that rejects in a large measures the causalities that were his is alienated, and risk to lose his/her/its universe. He/it has been dispossessed some spiritually. To recover it it is necessary to adhere à a system of anti-hypotheses or to create his/her/its own system, for it's true that the world is not only there, à côté : it is also that that one in fait ». This work is continuous and shows in the subjects of the militans that look for à to connect each of their acts à their identity azérie. He/it stretches fair à of the ethnicité a project totaling that every militant's life frames. But he/it also lets him a large margin of manoeuvre because he/it conceives himself his/her/its own definition of the identity azérie from various sources in which he/it draws according to his/its interest.

The réflexivité of the Self also appears in the reports that these militans tie with the researcher who analyzes them. Whereas the nationalistic leaders or the first cohorts of militans see in the researcher a means reinsuring on the exactness of their engagement or to mediatize their struggle in the western countries, the militancy that borrows à there the statements of the Réflexivité of the Self also finds an appraisal of the movement national azéri. This
difference is bound to the possession of a more cultural big business within the groups oriented toward the other. She/it drives to a will of incorporation of the elements of the scientific speech in nationalism, especially visible phenomenon for an approach in term of kind. She/it shows that these militants don’t want to let themselves regiment in the national movement. They wish to have their word to say and that the ideological construction of nationalism is not confiscated by the present leaders. There the high-level of education is again, an explanatory element of a least disposition of the new generations to the submissiveness to a greatly classified order and to the practices of delegation. This least disposition obliges them to appropriate themselves the movement, to reconfigure it according to their own valeurs, of their quest of an esteem of Oneself.

This work of réflexivité of the Self proves to be exhausting to the long for the militants because it asks for a permanent effort of justification and appropriation of their engagement. Nevertheless, the militants recognize that the payments offered by militancy are sufficient extensively to reward the well stocked efforts. The context of the Islamic Republic of Iran explains it extensively. The weak opportunities of social integration make of the nationalistic movement a powerful palliative by which the militants fit in a group, where a role is assigned them and where they are recognized for this task.

*Militancy oriented toward the group and the faces of ambivalence*

In this case, the decision to commit makes itself on an idea of contestation of the universe of sense where appears to a lack cruel of consistency of the representations of the world. These militants feel the aporias fully to which collides the Iranian society. To recover a coherent universe, the militants proceed of the simplifications that allows them to enroll in a new reality where their individual trajectories are reinvented according to the imperatives that are supposed to imply the adherence to the nation azéri or, of the less, à his/her/its vanguard. The resolution of tensions that proceeds this contestation makes itself mainly through the intermediary of the faces of the ambivalence. They act as interface between the universe of sense that the militants azéris contests and the one to which they adhere and permit to reduce the intellectual and emotional cost that the adherence implies such a movement. While rejecting in block the ideology of the Islamic Republic, these militants reproduce many inherited diagrams of their Moslem socialization unconsciously.

The first face of ambivalence holds some myths to which refer the nationalists to give a sense to the present, to connect to a famous past and to
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pave the path of a radiant future. They operate on a method similar to those forged by the Moslem. The face of Babak, that rebelled against the Arabian domination and whose death was epic, dominate the nationalistic mythology. In an aesthetics close to the popular devotion surrounding the Shiite imams, Babak is presented under features similar to those of imam Hosseyn, particularly venerated Tabriz. The militants are invited to follow his/her/its example in his/her/its struggle against the Arabian oppression, to being ready to sacrifice itself/themselves for the reason. The popular mass unification in a nation passes, to take the words of Farhad Khosrokhavar on the Islamic Revolution, by the capacity to go until the tip, à to accept the effusion of blood. The martyrdom occupies a central position in the mythology nationaliste : the Azérises must assemble around those that gave their life in the national liberation struggle. It is well the modern political practice of the revolutionary Shiism that is taken by a part of the nationalistic militants. The religious argumentaire disappears à the profit of nationalism, but the ideological setting remained similar. Nationalism appears in a process of in conformity with social liberation the Moslem ideology developed by Ali Shariati. The Azérises must abandon their stance attentiste–or even quiétiste to take the religious name–and to enter into a struggle dead against the iniquitous regime of the Islamic Republic.

On this mythology of the martyrdom transplants itself the dismissal of the west as second face of the ambivalence in militancy oriented toward the group. There he/it comes again, from the modern political practice of the revolutionary Shiism. These militants, descended of the popular surroundings, exècrent the behavior of the young of the middle classes that survalorisent a wild consumption of western goods. Indeed, this type of practices consuméristes is with difficulty accessible to them considering their economic means. However, these practices are denounced permanently by the tendencies populists of the Moslem power that describes a westernization of the Iranian society there. These militants enroll in the continuity of the representations of the urban popular youth that estimates to have made the Revolution and to be in right to withdraw a social advancement of it and economic. This isolationist cultural speech of the Moslem acts as face of ambivalence for the militants azéris. He/it allows them to justify the dismissal of a modernity that they don't master and of which they are excluded. By this dismissal, they justify this exclusion that is undergone then more but becomes a real choice of paid valeurs like authentic. This face of the ambivalence lets appear to the need of affirmation of the subjectivity deeply felt by these militants.

A third prominent face meets in the morals and the sexual practices that the nationalistic engagement implies for these militants. These last can
impose themselves one strict life style that forbids them to have some
relations with young women before the marriage. The patriarchal Moslem
État gives itself the role of guard of the masculine honor while putting
itself/themselves like guarantor of the modesty and the honor of the women
(namous). This role, a long time devolved à the Moslem youth, is partially
taken by a part of the young nationalistic militants that makes himself a duty
to watch à the protection of the women of their community. Prégnant in the
society azérie, the namous makes as office of interface between the
traditional home environment and the nationalistic engagement. He/it
permits to create a demarcation line between the group, this time spread à
the women who surround it, and the rest of the society. There the face of
ambivalence serves à again, to transfigure the inferiority cultural and social
of these militants in a mental superiority. If they shared the valeurs of the
Iranian youth, they cannot make the experience of it and find unconsciously,
in militancy oriented toward the group, a means of more to feel their
inferiority.

Thanks to these faces of the ambivalence, the emotional and intellectual
cost of the engagement is réduit : the transition between the universes of
Moslem and nationalistic sense is relatively comfortable for youngsters who
have been marked strongly by the fashions of thought taught in the schools
of the Islamic Republic. They also explain the adherence pure and hard à the
nationalistic myths and the dismissal of all shape of pluralism that militancy
oriented toward the group transports. Paradoxically, this militancy takes the
modes of working of the Islamic youth while having for objective the
reversing of the Islamic regime.

À the breast of this militancy oriented toward the group, the importance of
the ambivalence faces demonstrates the impact of socialization by the
institutions of the Islamic Republic on a part of the Iranian youth. This
Moslem socialization superimposes itself à the religion and à the traditional
valeurs to form a habitus whose militants cannot detach themselves without
running a risk of personal rupture. Their engagement is therefore greatly
tinted of the valeurs that has been instilled to them in their childhood and of
which they are not able to themselves départir. The young post - Moslem
demonstrate them, a bigger capacity à to appropriate their own engagement
by a permanent work of integration of their new universe of sense à their
personal trajectory.

Conclusion

The nationalistic engagement of the young azéris is a new social reality
that is à the joint of two social mobilizations in the Iran contemporain : the
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ethnic movements and youth. He/it appears like one the answers à the difficulties of social integration that the young Azériises meet. Miss them of social recognition, the boredom that they express, find a derivative in the nationalistic engagement. He/it offers them a whole set of payments that the Iranian society proves incapable to procure them. Finally valorized, they meet built-in in a group of militants that requires their part a strong investment and constitute their new universe of sense. They show their dismissal of the Moslem regime there, sometimes with virulence, and call à a reversing of the system.

This survey draws the contours of one youth Iranian more polysémique que it is not presented very often. The post - Moslem youth provides the majority of the militants and the type of socialization that it implies begins à to print his/her/its mark à the national movement, evolution that should become more pronounced with time. But to make vary the degree of opening of the post - Moslem youth ideal - type reveals all a fringe of youth that has less benefitted of the modernization sociodémographique of Iran. More labelled by the traditional structures and the islamisation of the society posterior à the Revolution, his/her/its militancy leans on a more radical speech and a dismissal of the shapes of modernity that appear in Iran. It is necessary to note the absence of young Azériises descended of the comfortable classes, that is not quite of the represented within the movement national also; the shapes of payment that the nationalistic militants withdraw don't interest them because they can satisfy them elsewhere. Besides, the presence unexpected of Ahmadinejad à the second tour of the presidential elections of 2005, made to reappear a Moslem youth that one had maybe too quickly buried. The scattering of the votes à the elections of 2005 prove that this young vote that had made success of Mohammad Khatami doesn't exist anymore. Thus, the Iranian youth is far from forming an univocal social group, all acquirement à the reforms. It is therefore the very notion of post - Moslem youth that seems to exhaust itself. She/it provided an useful theoretical setting, but she/it is today spongy and don't seem more capable to describe the situation polysémique that characterizes the Iranian youth of the after Khatami.